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THE REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE DESIGN TEST: BACK TO NEGLIGENCE?

CAREL J.J.M. STOLKER Professor ofLaw, Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, The Netherlands
DAVID I. LEVINE Professor of Law, Universrty of California, Hastings College of the Law

I. INTRODUCTION
For a long time, people in the Netherlands assumed that their
legal systern would not endure an American-style "liability
crisis" or "litigation explosion". During the last few years,
however, Dutch legal scholars have been increasingly
concerned about the possibility of a liability insurance crisis
developing. Representatives of insurance companies appear
more regularly äs Speakers on this topic at Conferences and
Symposiums devoted to civil litigation. That they are invited
provides at least one indication of the concern that many in the
Netherlands feel about whether individuals and enterprises will
continue to be able to obtain liability insurance. The same
concern exists in many other European countries.
2. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
T ,.
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In this context, some developments are worth mentionmg. The
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DES judgment from the Dutch Supreme Court is more and,more
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solicitors, accountants, and engmeers, legally responsible for
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malpractice is for many a tell-tale sign of an impendmg crisis.
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As far äs liability insurance m the medical realm is
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concerned, almost all insurance companies have witndrawn
. . .
, . . i. , r
.
t
from the market during the last few years. At present, only
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Nationale Nederlanden and two mutual insurers, MediRisk and·
_
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. . „
._ , N
„.
, « „u·
CentraMed (previously Centraal Beheer), continue to offer this
insurance in the Netherlands. Moreover, some Dutch Academic
Hospitals have had to seek insurance through Lloyd's of London.
One hospital, the Academic Hospital Maastricht, provides its
own primary coverage, with a re-insurer standing behind it for
excess liability 2
During the peak of the liability insurance crisis in the U.S.,
, . , „ . , . , .
.
one also saw the withdrawal of for-proflt insurance companies
from the market, with some mutual insurers coming in to take
l HR October 9, 1992, NJ 1994, 535. This ruling is considered to be very
pro-plaintiff. On the issue of causation, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled
that the pharmaceutical companies named m the lawsuit can be held jointly
and severally liable (instead of, e.g. only for their marketshare), even if the
plaintiff can not prove which particular Company caused tha plaintiff's
damages. The question whether the drug DES was in fact defective, though,
has still not been decided.
2 De Volkskrant, November 2, 1995 (in Dutch).

their place. Another parallel development is the change from
"loss occurrence" Insurance policies to "Claims made" policies.1
It is far from clear whether these developments—withdrawal
from the insurance market, changing to the Claims made instead
of the loss occurrence policies—were really necessary in the
,
U.S. or the Netherlands.' Among many other reasons, insurers
say that they are dealing with reluctant re-insurers.
In one respect at least, it cannot be denied that the number
of Claims is on the increase in the Netherlands, while from to
time completely new types of Claims emerge. For example,
consider the large number of Claims regarding failed Sterilisation
,
that have been filed during the last few years, äs well äs the
successful claim for non-pecuniary damages awarded to the
parents of a baby that was injured äs the result of a doctor's fault;
this claim had not been allowed by Dutch law.6 In addition,
there is concern about the possibility of a floodgate of Claims in
cases of Professional illnesses(e. p. asbestosis). Some, therefore,
*
ö
believe that the greatest
flood of Claims is still ahead
of us.
ö
t
Furthermore, the increase in the number of^potential causes
of actionsounding
°in strict liability
'concern many.
j For example,
v >
the Dutch Civil Code has recently been enriched with the
'
recognition of a number of new potential causes of action for
B
v
liability for a variety of dangerous substances.7 In particular, the
'
J
r
environmental liabilities have been the subiect of heated
discussion. One concern in the Netherlands has been the
understandingt, that Lloyd's
of London got
ι
» into its liquidity
ι ι
difficulties äs a result of unexpectedly large environmental

3^ pRODUCT LIABILITY
^he tneory °f strict product liability also deserves some
3 See more in detail Stolker's book on the American malpractice crisis. Van
r
ans naar aavocoat, Kluwer, BSH 1989, pp. 6 ei seq. (m Dutch).
4 Marc C. Rahdert, Covermg Accvdent Costs, Insurance, Lrabi//ty, ond Tort
Reform (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1995).
5 See P.C.M. Habets, "Schadeclaims naar aanleiding van mislukte
sterilisaties: een dossieronderzoek", TvG 1995, pp. 266 et seq. (in Dutch).
6July 5, 1995, TvG 1995, p. 446; NJkort 1995, 35 (in Dutch).
7 For a comprehensive overview see G.E. van Maanen, NTBR 1996, p. 6 (in
Dutch).
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attention,althoughtheexceptionallysmallnumberof such legal
proceedmgs m the Netherlands bears no resemblance to the
number of pages wntten on this subject The fear m Europe that
a cnsis in the law of liability will occur is almost always put mto
terms of what is perceived to be the American expenence for
Europeans, America is the ultimate country of stnct liability
However, when looking at the Dutch figures, the expenence
with product liability is not äs bad äs some had expected, at least
äs far äs legal proceedmgs are concerned Pubhshed cases are a
ranty, especially when compared with the frequency of cases
devoted to medical or traffic Claims
The expenence m the Netherlands does not seem to be
much different than m the US A 1991 report conducted by the
RAND Institute for Civil Justice found that in a large sample of
consumers who claimed to have been mjured by a product, only
l per cent hired an attorney for advice on whether tofilesuit 8
Similarly, a study by the Consumer Product Safety Gommission
found that fewer than 3 per cent of consumers mjuied by
products ever filed a claim for compensation Among those
consumers mjured by design defects who dofilelawsmts, their
likehhood of winmng is, on average, only 35-40 per cent 9
In the U S , it is mainly the case that there have been specific
products that have caused the perception that there has been an
avalanche of proceedmgs

cases m State courts m 1992 '" Over a year-long penod endmg
June 30, 1992, jury verdicts in State general junsdiction courts
m the 75 most populous counties in the U S were studied The
followmg is a summary of the outcome of the study Of all cases
that reached a trial by jury, 79 per cent were tort actions, 18 per
cent contract, and 2 per tent real property cases If we take a
closer look at these tort cases, we find the followmg data Of all
tort cases in the sample heard by junes, 33 per cent were
automobile torts, 11 per cent medical malpractice, 5 per cent
product liability and 5 per cent toxic substance
Examming the wmners (successful plamtiffs) and losers
(unsuccessful plamtiffs) of these suits, the study found the
results given m Table 2
Table 2
Jury award
automobile
medical malpractice
product liability
toxic substance

Wmners

Losers

60%
30%
40%
74%

40%
70%
60%
26%

Fmally, what did the wmners receive' Table 3 shows the final
award amounts for civil jury cases with plamtiff wmners

Table l
Number of proceedmgs
Year

Asbestos

Dalkon Shield

Benedectin

Other products

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

4
35
40
103
292
361
1137
1625
1869
1926
2922
4389
5627

8
82
136
153
88
125
286
388
555
472
805
1410
444

—
—
—
1
0
0
22
50
73
171
420
594
40

1504
2532
3234
3475
3599
4252
4714
5509
5600
5894
5784
6051
6586

Sources Forasbcstos AclmmistraUtive Office of the U S Courts and the l ederaljudicul Center for the Dalkon Shield AH Robms Company Ine and
for Benedtctin Mcrrell Dow Pharmaccuücals. Ine
So, the so-called products liability cnsis in the U S is to a great
extent an asbestos and a Dalkon Shield cnsis (see TabJe 1)
Other mterestmg data on product liability Claims m the U S
confirm these trends One important source of Information is a
huge survey conducted by the U S Department of Justice of
8 Reporters Study l Enter/mse Responsibility for Personal Ιημιγ p 269 (ALI
1991) quoted by Elizabeth C Pnce l oward a Unified Theory of Products
Liability Revivmg the Causative Concept of Legal Fault Tennessee Law
Review 1994 p 1320
9idem p 399

On the basis of this large-scale study by the U S Justice
Department, one can conclude that m companson to
automobile torts and medical malpractice Claims, products
liability cases make up a sigmficantly smallei number of cases
More plamtiffs lose their cases than wm, when plamtiffs do wm,
however, the compensation awarded m products liability cases
IS relatively high compared tO most Other tort C3SCS What these

10 U S Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report
July 1995
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Table 3
Case type

Mediän ($)

Mean ($)

Over $250,000 (%)

$1 million or more (%)

51,000
101,000
29,000
260,000
201,000

408,000
526,000
220,000
727,000
1,484,000

21 2
304
127
50.5
47.1

78
13.3
4.0
15.4
24.8

all tort cases
toxic substance
automobile
product liability
medical malpractice

data do not provide us, however, is the number of settlements
and the compensation that was given in settlements

4. STALEMATE; RESTATEMENT
In the U.S., product liability finds itself in the limelight. For years
now, consumer organisations and trial lawyers on the one side
and those aligned with manufacturers on the other side, have
opposed each other. As a recent publication from Mark C.
Rahdert puts it:
«The debate over tort reform and the insurance crisis has
been a largely partisan affair Advocates on both sides have
painted their positions with extremely broad brushes. All
too often, they have been content to rest their conclusions
on sweeping, undocumented, and often unexamined
assertions about the connection between rising insurance
costs and the structure of tort doctrine. State legislatures
(the chief engines of tort reform), and to some extent the
courts, have responded in an equally broad-brush, reactive
fashion, with a marked preference for the quickfixover the
comprehensive solution. Inevitably pressed for time and
strapped for resources, they have seldom investigated
much below the surface of this complex topic.""
For a very long time now, manufacturers have tried to convince
the U.S. Congress to pass legislation which would establish a
unifoimfederal Standard for product liability, but that effort has
never succeeded. This is mainly because the various pressure
groups are quite well balanced politically. Manufacturers, for
.,.....,..
example, have tried for a long time to mtroduce liability limits or
.....
..
.„.
caps, therestrictionortheabolitionofthepossibilityof pumtive
, , ... _ . .
damages and the restriction of strict liability. Other interest
,. . ...
...
groups have tried to maintain as much strict liability as possible.
,.
In certain instances, they have even advocated a System of pure
strict liability (also known as causative liability). The result has
been that there has been no revolutionary change in the U.S.
The case law varies, sometimes leaning more towards one, and
at other times leaning more towards the other.
There has now been a new development, which might be
able to break the Stalemate: the American Law Institute is
engaged in developing a new Restatement (Third) Of TortS,

l l Marc C Rahdert, Covenng Acadent Costs, Insurance, Liability, and Tort
Reform (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1995), pp. 3-4

starting with the law of product liability.12 The ALI's
Restatements are a unique type of private, advisory code.
Although they are not binding äs legislation, unless a court or
legislature chooses to follow them, for decades the
D
,
,
, . .
Restatements have proven to be extremely authoritative
pronouncements of the law. Perhaps the most famous has been
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which has been of enormous
influence on American tort law for 30 years.
S. THE ALTERNATIVE DESIGN TEST
!t is a fact that the discussions in the ALI on the proposal
regarding the alternative design test have been heated. In
American academic writing, some authors are already speaking
of the new Pr°P°sal as bein§ a 8iant steP backwards from strict
liability towards "super negligence".11 In this article we would
like to concentrate on one of the most controversial novelties:
the indusion of the alternative design test where design defects
in Para· *& are concerned. The section makes the classic
distinctions between manufacturing defects, design defects and
»«tances of inadequate warnings or instructions Under the
P»posed new Restatement, manufacturing defects would be
subJect to strict liability· If the Plaintiff can Prove that it is
probable that the product failed to comply with reasonable
consumer's expectations because of a manufacturing defect,
^e can jnvoke strict liability
Design defects, on the other hand, would be governed
exclusively by a new, and more stringent, liability Standard. That
part of ^ prOposed new section reads as follows:
a product isdefective in design when the foreseeablerisks
of härm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design
··. and the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe".
The bürden of proof lies with the victim. He must prove that a
reasonable alternative design was feasible and that without the
alternative design, it was not reasonable to manufacture and seil
the product. That is why some commentators say the new
12 Restatement (Third) of Torts Products üabihty (March 13, 1995),
accepted m part by the members of the American Law Institute
13 See for example Elizabeth C. Price, supra, 1995, and Philip H Corboy (a
famous plaintiff lawyer), "The Not-So-Quiet Revolution· Rebuildmg Barners
tojury Trial m the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts Product
Liability", Tennessee Law Rewew 1995, p 1043
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design defect test should not be classified äs a mere negligence
Standard' perhaps "super" negligence would be a more
appropriate label. If the proposal were to be followed, mere
proof that a product's risk outweighs its Utility would no longer
be sufficient äs a basis to impose liability
Atfirstglance there seems to be a difference here with

safe car would be like As most people would call this
hypothetical vehicle a tank, and not a car, it would not be
considered to be a reasonable alternative.16

European law. the Directive defined "defect" in terms of
consumer expectations.

Js the proposal before the ALI a giant Step backwards in the law
of product iiabüity? First, consider some of the nuances that the

"A product is defective when it does not provide the safety
which a person is entitled to expect, taking all
circumstances into account, including
(a) the presentation of the product;
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected
that the product would be put;
(c) the time when the product was put into
circulation "H
On the other hand, we should not forget that the bürden of
proof in Europe also lies with the victim: "(t]he injured person
shall be required to prove the damage, the defect and the causal
relationship between defect and damage" (article 4 of the
Directive) Even so, it seems to be easier for the plaintiff to prove
that he was entitled to expect something eise ratherthan that he
has to prove that an alternative design would have been feasible.

'FFERENT
Why is the proposed new Restatement making a distinction
between manufacturing defects and design defects? The official
comment gives the following explanation." Whereas a
manufacturing defect consists of a product unit's failure to meet
the manufacturer's design specifications, a product asserted to
have a defective design meets the manufacturer's specifications
but raises the question whether the specifications themselves
create unreasonable risks.
Answering that question requires reference to a Standard
outside the specifications. Therefore subsection (b) adopts a
reasonableness (i.e. a "risk/utility" balancing) test äs the
Standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs. More
specifically—according to the Comment—the test is whether a
reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable cost, have
reduced the foreseeable risks of härm posed by the product and,
if so, whether the omission of the alternative design rendered
the product not reasonably safe.
In SUffl, a double reasonableness test is at the heart Of the
proposal! Under prevailing rules COncerning allocation Of
„ ,
„
,
,,
bürden of proof, the plaintiff must prove that such a reasonable
alternative was, or reasonably could have been, available at the
time of sale or distribution In the case of the second
reasonableness test, imagine what the most accident-proof and

7· SEVERAL NUANCES

Restatement itself offers.
Some academic comments on the new Restateraent argue
that every P™ducer will proclaim that its product design was
the safest m use at the time of sale and that a proposed
alternative design was not adopted by any manufacturer, or
even considered for commercial use at the time of sale.
Ncvcrtheless, if a plaintiff mtroduces expert testimony to
establish that a reasonable alternative design could practically
have been adopted, a trier of fact may conclude that the design
of the product was defective.17
While the plaintiff must prove that a reasonable alternative
design would have reduced the foreseeable risks of härm,
para 2(b) does not require the plaintiff actually to produce a
prototype in order to make out a prima facie case. For example,
qualified expert testimony on the issue would suffice, if it
reasonably Supports the conclusion that a reasonable alternative
design could have been adopted at the time of sale. Nor is the
plaintiff required to establish in detail the costs and benefits
associated with adoption of the suggested alternative design '«
Also, the Restatement Comment argues, given the relative
Mmitations on the plaintiff's access to relevant data, the plaintiff
is not required to establish in detail the costs and benefits
associated with adoption of the suggested alternative design.19
Earlrin the development of product liability law, U.S courts
held that a claim based on design defect could not be sustained if
the dangers presented by the product were open and obvious.
From the earlr WOs, however, many courts have accepted the
legitimacy of complaints that a product risk, albeit patent, was
"unreasonably dangerous" and that the product was defective
under ^ction 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.20
Consequently, the new subsection (b) does not recognise the
obviousness of a design-related risk äs precluding a finding of
defectiveness. The fact that a danger is open and obvious is
relevant to the issue of defectiveness, but does not necessarily
'6 For examPle· Dre"°"«<*" Volkswagenwerk, A G, 489 F (2d) 1066 (4th
Cir 1974) (considenng whether a Volkswagen van is "defective" because it
was not deslgned w|th a |ong hood contalning tne motor of the van) Tne
case and issue are discussed by Richard L Cupp, "Definmg the Boundanes
of'Alternative Design'Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts The
Nature and Role of Substitute Products m Design Defect Analysis", 63
Tgnn L Rgv 329 ^ ^
17 Restatement, Comment at 18.
18 /bid Comment at 25

14 Art 6 of the Directive

19 ibid

15 Restatement, Comment at p 19

20 See, e g Jane Stapleton, Product Liability (Butterworths, 1994), p 258
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preclude a plaintiif from establishmg that a reasonable
alternative design should have been adopted thdt would have
reduced or prevented härm to the plamtiff21
Also, there are products of mamfestly unreasonable
design Take the example of a toy gun that shoots hard rubber
pellets with sufficient velocity to cause mjury to children
However, the proposed Restdtement Comment notes, if
tonsideration is limited to toy guns that are capable of causmg
mjury, then no reasonable alternative will, by defimtion, be
available In that case, the court can condemn the pioduct
design äs defective and not reasonably safe, because the
extremely high degree of danger posed by its use or
consumption so substantially outweighs its negligible Utility that
no rational adult, fully aware of the relevant facts, would choose
to use or consume the product Thus, manufacturers may be
held liable for mjunes caused by such products even without
proof of a reasonable alternative design 22

the Northwestern Umversity School of Law durmg the ALI
sessions on the new draft in May 1995 24 He charged that the
new text focuses too much on the nsk-utility balance and not
enough on consumer expectations He offered an amendment
that would demote the reasonable alternative design
requirement to one of five considerations courts must take into
account in determmmg whethei a product is defective Besides
the consumer expectations factor, the other considerations
would include whether the nsk of the product outweighs its
Utility, whether the nsk of the product outweighs the cost
associated with the mjury, whether a reasonable seller or
distributor would have expected the nsk of mjury that
occurred, and whether the advertising, promotion, and
appearance of the product created an Impression of safety
Shapo s proposal structurally resembles the European
approach a number of (more co-oidmated) factors with an
important role for consumer expectations

8. SECTION 3 OF THE PROPOSED RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)

10. RELEVANT FACTORS WITHIN THE
RESTATEMENT: CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS

Furthermore, some protection for plamtiffs who cannot
demonstrate a reasonable alternative design is oflered by
section3oftheRestatement 1 hat section allows courts to mfer
that the plamtiff's härm was caused by a product defect,
without proof of the specific nature of the defect, when
circumstantial evidence mdicates that it is more likely than not
that the härm was caused by a defective product rather than by
other possible causes
The Comment" gives the followmg example John
purchased a new electnc kitchen blender He used it exclusively
for makmg milkshakes Shortly after John purchased the
blender, while he was makmg a milkshake, the blender
suddenly shattered A piece of glass struckjohn s eye, causmg
härm John s expert, after exammmg the pieces of glass,
concludes that the blender was defective The expert is unable
toconclude whether the blender was defectively manufactured
or defective m design, because the product was destroyed m the
accident The evidence, the Comment argues, would be
sufficient to allow the tnei of fact to considei whether the
product was m fact defective, even though the plamtiff has not
established the exact nature of the defect The mcident resultmg
m härm is of a kind that would ordmanly occur only äs a result of
product defect So, m this case, section 3 offers a (rathei
narrow) escape from the requirement of provmg a reasonable
alternative design

Professor Twerski, one of the two Reporters of the new
Restatement, argued however, that the consumer test is not
abandoned by the new Restatement, but that it remams an
important factor for junes to consider " The Comment on
section 2(b) also would allow consideration of a broad ränge of
factors m determmmg whether an alternative design is
reasonable and whether its omission renders a product not
reasonably safe The factors in the Comment include the
magmtude of the foreseeable nsks oi härm the accompanymg
mstructions and warmngs, the nature and strength of consumer
expectations regaiding the product, the relative advantages and
disadvantages of the pioduct äs designed and äs it alternatively
could have been designed, and the effects of the alternative
design on production costs, product longevity, mamtenance
and repair, esthetics and marketability 26 It is important to note
that lt ls not d lelevant factor that the imposition of hability
would have a negative effect on corporate earnmgs or would
reduce employment m a given industry 27
We cannot say the ALI s proposal even with its explanatory
commentary, is crystal clear If we are correct, the alternative
design test will fulhll the function of gatekeeper When the
plamtiff can not pomt to an alternative design, the manufacturer
will not be liable unless it has chosen a mamfestly unreasonable
(velT dangeious) design At this stage the balance between
nsk/utility also plays a part However, if an alternative destgn
was available, and the omission of that alternative renders the
product not reasonably safe a broad ränge of factors

9. PROPOSAL BY PROFESSOR SHAPO
An even more senous attack was raised by Professor Shapo of

24 ALI Approves Product Liabihty Draft The United States Law Week May
2Q 1995 ,63 LW 2734.

21 Restatement Comment at 20 and 21

25 /dem

22 ibid Comment at 2l and 22

26 Restatement Comment at 24

23 Comment at 130

27 »dem
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legitimately may be considered in determmmg whether an
alternative design is reasonable
All, or some, of these factors may determme whether or not
the product is defectively designed The Comment adds
however, that the plamtiff is not necessanly required to
introduce proofon all of these factors 28They will varyfromcase
to case

II. CASE LAWON THE ALTERNATIVE DESIGN
Much of the discussion m the American scholarly literature on
the new proposal has focused on whether the proposed
treatment of the alternative design lest is m accordance with the
case law Indeed this very much remams to be seen 29
Concordance with case law is important to the extent
commentators believe that the appropriate goal of the
Restatements merely should be to accurately track—to
restate —the development of the common law or whether it is
also appropriate for the ALI to attempt to shape the future
direction of the development of the common law
The case law is very vaned fhere are junsdicüons which
hold that the plamtiff need not show a reasonable alternaüve
design test m order to hold the manufacturer liable for design
defects For example m Ogg v City ofSpnngfield," two women
were electrocuted when the Hobie Cat catamaran sailboat they
were sailmg struck an overhangmg power Ime The issue was
whether the mastcould have been constructed of a matcnal that
would not conduct electnuty The Illinois Court of Appeals
concluded our Supreme Court has never mcluded the
existenceof a feasible alternative design äs oneof the elements a
plamtiff must prove m order to succeed m a products liability
case
Thus the existence of an alternative design becomes
not an element of proof but mstead merely one method oi
provmg one of the elements of proof—that the product was
unreasonably dangerous
Other junsdictions hold that the alternative design test is
only one of several factors which may be considered m
determmmg whether a product design is defective In
Montgomery Elevator v McCullough " a products hability smt
was brought agamst an escalator manufacturer to recover for
injunes which a lOyearold child sustamed His foot was
crashedmthespacebetweenthetreadsandthesideskirtofthe
escalator, resultmg m amputation of his big toe The Kentucky
court considered a reasonable alternative design äs merely one
factor to be weighed by the jury

12 /\ GlANT STEP BACKWARDS?
If " ad°Pts the P™P°^ new Restatement provisions will the
American Law Institute be leadmg American courts mto takmg
the Uw d 8unt steP backwaids' Would U S law, m practice,
Γεα11^ start to dlffer &***? from Eur°Pe s> wlth Its consumer
expectations test' We wonder for vanous reasons
(d) the alternative design test of the new Restatement
would apply only to design defects not to
manufactunng defects,
φ) even if he does not have to produce an alternative
prototype the bürden of proof on consumer
expectations m Europe—äs a prmciple—still rests with
the plamtiff,
(t) even under the proposed new Restatement,
manufacturers may be liable for härm caused by
mamfestly dangerous products without proof of a
reasonable alternative design,
(d) m the U S the nsk/utility balance will still play a role,
(e) ,n almost all of the European countnes, the
manufacturer may mvoke the development nsk
defence
(f) m case of design defects it will often come down to a
statement of an external expert or on the simple
companson to a safer product that is already sold m the
market
Finally, and this seems to be forgotten by the opponents of the
new Restatement, it is not true that the law regarding product
liability is stnct liability/jer se, although it does sound stnct In

2g idem
29 See eg a comprehensive overview by Frank J Vandall The
Restatement (Third) of Torts Product Liability Section 2(b) The
Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement Tennessee Law Review 1995
pp 1407 et seq
30 458 N E (2d) 1331 (III App Ct 1984}
3l 676 S W (2d) 776 (Ky 1984)

There are also junsdictions which place the bürden on the
defendant to prove the product was not defective In
Caterpillar Tractor Col v Beck n the plamtiff was killed when
his front end loader which he was operating rolled over an
embankment The tractor had no roll over protective structure
(ROPS) His widow sued the tractor Company The Supreme
Court of Alaska tarefully considered the reasonable alternative
design requirement and rejected it, stating we hold the
plamtiff need only to show that he was mmred and that the
t.
.. f.
,
.
mjury was proximately caused by the product s design
Profesor Frank J Vandall, m his article carefully surveymg
the case law under the Restatement (Second) s Standard, comes
to tlle conclusion that the alternative design requirement is not
supported by the majonty of the junsdictions m the U S that
have considered the question In addition he contends that the
reasonable alternative design requirement violates fundamental
pohues of products hability "

32 593 P (2d)734 (Haw 1983)
3 3 Suprfl at 1428 An exhaustive survey of the law of the American states
performed by a practitioner reaches the same conclusion John F Vargo
The Emperor s New Clothes The American Law Institute Adorns a New
Cloth for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects—A Survey of the
States Reveals A Different Weave 26 U Memphis L Rev 493 (1996)
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our view, European products liability law is, apart from the
quasi-vicarious liability of other suppliers under the Directive
(art 3), only really "strict" in so far äs manufacturing defects
are concerned.M That conclusion is also reached by Jane

either analysis, it will almost always be of importance whether
an alternative design was available and whether the consumer
was entitled to expect that alternative.

Stapleton:

14. CONCLUSIONS

"Analysis of the core idea of 'defect' in the E.C product rule
Shows,first,that contrary to the common description of
those rules äs imposing 'strict liability' on manufacturers of
products, the 'defect' notion in combination with
Article 6(2) and the defence in Article 7(e) of the Directive
generates a liability on manufacturers rarely, if ever, greater
than the liability in negligence and one that is often
narrower "

We conclude that both regimes—the third Restatement and the
Directive—do not differ that much from one another with
respect to design defects. Almost always it comes down to
whether an alternative design is possible and whether this is
aiso a reasonable alternative, and what the consumer could
reasonably expect. The only doubtful Situation is what results
when it cannot be proven that there was a reasonable
alternative but the trier of fact could fairly conclude that the
reasonable consumer was entitled to expect better safety from

13. WHAT MATTERS IS THE BÜRDEN OF PROOF

the pr°duCt· If the pr°P°Sed new Restatement test is ad°Pted
and followed in the U.S. courts, some future injured plaintiffs in
Nevertheless, what really matters—in both Europe and the
America might very well be worse off than a similar plaintiff in
U.S.—is how the judge will (and should) handle the bürden of
Europe because the U.S. trial judge will not let the jury decide
proof. This is the reason why the Dutch Government, with its
the case. The trial judge will be obligated to enter judgment for
flexible division of the bürden of proof from the Dutch Code of
the defendant if, äs a matter of law, the plaintiff's case is legally
Civil Procedure (in principle the person who Claims carries the
inadequate due to the failure to prove that a reasonable
bürden of proof, yet that bürden can shift to the other party
alternative design actually existed. What we don't know is how
when the court considers such is reasonable and appropriate in
many injured persons will fall into this category. In any event,
light of the circumstances of the case), for so long tried to keep
one can expect that in some of these cases, the judge could very
the somewhat unsubtle rule on the bürden of proof from the
well reach a just solution with the help of the risk/benefit lest. In
European Directive out of the Dutch Civil Code. This has finally, other cases, the plaintiff may prevail because the defect is not
under pressure of the manufacturing lobby, failed, but one
one of design, but is a manufacturing flawor can beconsidered a
works from the presumption that the reasonableness of the
failure to warn.
Situation can bring the judge to change the bürden of proof
Where design defects are concerned, negligence is
And is it not already true that in the Netherlands and in the
consequently very important and may well become even more
U.S., in cases of design defects, an expert will need to be called
important in the future in U.S. law. However, product liability
in for help' It is our opinion that, äs a practical matter, in many of
never has been exclusively a reginie of strict liability. It seems
the American design cases it does not really matter all that much
that American tort law may be about to engage in an experiment
which System one chooses· the alternative design test äs
where the mix will include a little more negligence and a little
gatekeeper with a consumer expectations test afterwards, or
less strict liability. As there is little evidence demonstrating that
applying a consumer expectations test directly. The reason it U.S. law is labouring under a crisis which demands a revision of
may not matter very much which test is utilised is that the trier
the law of product liability, and even less evidence that Europe
of fact's conclusion about the "expectation of the consumer"
is suffering one, we recommend that the Old World let their
will be heavily influenced by the answer to the question
American cousins in the New World embark on this experiment
whether an alternative design would have been feasible. Under
alone.

34 At least one important U S commenator contends that U S law is the
same "the concept of 'strict habilitx' applies properly only to manufacturing
flaw cases, and .. negligence principles and negligence doctnne govern
liability in design and warnmgs cases" David G Owen, "Defectiveness
Restated Explodmg the 'Strict' Products Liability Myth", 1996 U Illinois L
Rev 743,786(1996) Professor Owen believes that the proposed
Restatement (Third) should prociaim this distmction "forthi ightly"
35 Stapleton at pp 271—272
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